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I. INTRODUCTION
We treat noncompliance with disdain, and for good reason.' After all,
what does it mean to be a law if violation is permitted? And what does it mean
to be a legal system if disobedience is tolerated? This contempt for
noncompliance is such that we scorn the legal system that fails to uphold its
own rules. And just as we are conditioned to treat ineffective legal systems
with disdain, so too do we condemn individual acts of noncompliance.
This law and order view of noncompliance is not only the ideal-it is
also our own experience. In advanced national legal systems, such as that in
* Attorney-Adviser, Office of the Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State. This Essay was
written while the author was a Visiting Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Chicago Law
School (Autumn Quarter 2004). The author acknowledges the helpful comments of Rachel Brewster,
Monica Hakimi, Karen Johnson, Sarah Lytle, Steve Mathias, Sean Murphy, Eric Posner, Michael
Reisman, Lior Strahilevitz, Andrew Tauber, and the participants in a workshop at the University of
Chicago Law School. The views expressed are the author's own and not necessarily those of the
Department of State or the U.S. Government.
I. I assume in this Essay that there is a general duty to comply with law, including
international law, but I do not discuss the nature of that obligation. As will become clear, though,
whatever the basis for this obligation, be it moral or prudential, I argue that it can be overcome in the
international context in certain circumstances. There is, of course, an extraordinarily large literature
exploring the obligation to obey the law. See, e.g., Heidi M. Hurd, Challenging Authority, 100 YALE L.J.
1611 (1991). For discussions of the obligation to obey international law, see, for example, Michael J.
Glennon, How International Rules Die, 93 GEO. L.J. 939, 941-64 (2005), and Eric A. Posner, Do States
Have a Moral Obligation to Obey International Law?, 55 STAN. L. REv. 1901 (2003).
THE YALE JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 31:189
2the United States, though deviance from the rules occurs, principled
departures, such as acts of civil disobedience and vigilantism, are relatively
rare-not because domestic law is infallible, but because authoritative
legislative, executive, and judicial mechanisms create the rules and correct
them, because the rules themselves reflect community values and are
sufficiently specific, because obedience to the rules is recognized as crucial to
continued public order, and because executive power has the means to enforce
the system's rules when necessary. Our critical view of noncompliance,
therefore, is reinforced by the relative success of our polity in stemming
opportunities for disobedience and controlling disobedience when it does
occur. In other words, we can afford to eschew noncompliance.
Other systems, such as international law, are structurally less capable of
managing lawmaking and law enforcement at this sophisticated level. Though
it is said that compliance with international law is high,3 the international
system contains few legislative, judicial, or executive processes analogous to
those of States, and, consequently, the system's ability to self-correct and self-
enforce is much more limited, creating gaps between aspiration and authority,
procedures and policy.4 It is no wonder, then, that, in the absence of effective
mechanisms for decision and control, 5 States, on occasion, feel obliged, even
absent community sanction,6 to take actions that reflect current or developing
expectations of lawfulness or make existing law effective-that is, to bridge
the o erational gaps in the international system. Sometimes these actions are
legal, such as when the United States threatened to withhold much-needed
foreign assistance from Yugoslavia until that State transferred Slobodan
Milosevic to the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in
8accordance with its international obligations. But sometimes these actions
violate existing norms, as with the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo,
2. Such deviance reflects the lack of will to use coercive authority in particular situations
(traffic regulations, the use of illegal drugs), and not the lack of means to employ such coercion. See
Tom J. Farer, The Prospect for International Law and Order in the Wake of Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 621,
621 (2003). For discussions of lawful deviance in national law, see, for example, MORTIMER R. KADISH
& SANFORD H. KADISH, DISCRETION To DISOBEY: A STUDY OF LAWFUL DEPARTURES FROM LEGAL
RULES (1973). See also Oren Gross, Are Torture Warrants Warranted? Pragmatic Absolutism and
Official Disobedience, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1481, 1519-20 (2004).
3. See LOUIS HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 47 (2d ed. 1979);
cf Detlev F. Vagts, The United States and Its Treaties: Observance and Breach, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 313,
313 (2001) (arguing that "the U.S. record [regarding treaty observance] has not been as negative as some
have feared but that anxieties have been needlessly fueled in recent years by the reckless language of
both officials and scholars").
4. On the limitations on enforcement mechanisms in general, see ELISABETH ZOLLER,
PEACETIME UNILATERAL REMEDIES: AN ANALYSIS OF COUNTERMEASURES, at xii-xv (1984). On non-
forcible coercive measures, see Lori Fisler Damrosch, Enforcing International Law Through Non-
Forcible Measures, 269 RECUEIL DES COURS 9 (1997).
5. There are, of course, a number of relatively effective methods of decision and control
within the international system. For a discussion of institutional and treaty-based enforcement
mechanisms, see Jochen A. Frowein, Reactions by Not Directly Affected States to Breaches of Public
International Law, 248 RECUEIL DES COURS 345 (1994).
6. Such sanction could come from the Security Council, for example.
7. Such lawful acts are termed "retorsion." See ZOLLER, supra note 4, at 5. For their use by
the United States, see, for example, ELISABETH ZOLLER, ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW THROUGH
U.S. LEGISLATION 73-78 (1985).
8. See Marlise Simons, Milosevic Is Given to UN. for Trial in War-Crime Case, N.Y. TIMES,
June 29, 2001, at At.
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which, at least as a formal matter, breached international law. 9 This latter
category can be called "operational noncompliance"-noncompliance that
keeps a partially effective system,10 such as international law, operational by
reconciling formal legal prescriptions with changing community policies or by
bridging the enforcement gap created by inadequate community mechanisms
of control.
Operational noncompliance presents a special challenge to international
lawyers, who, well aware of the weaknesses of the international legal system
and eager to bolster the international rule of law and its substantive legal
prescriptions, are inclined, perhaps more so than their domestic law
colleagues, to take a reflexively hard line with noncompliant acts. This
predisposition has become increasingly strong since the end of the Cold War,
as the demise of the superpower conflict and the rise of the United States as
the global "hegemon"' 1 has led many to hope and desire that the international
rule of law would finally reign.12 It has grown stronger still since the Iraq
war, 13 which many thought violated international law.14 Indeed, the rule-of-
law sentiment is so strong today that, for many scholars, the most important
issue confronting international law is how to induce compliance with
international norms, that is, how to encourage nations to obey international
law.' 5 In the words of Louis Henkin, what matters most is the creation of an
9. See, e.g., Bruno Simma, NATO, the UN and the Use of Force: Legal Aspects, 10 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 1, 1 (1999).
10. See W. Michael Reisman, Unilateral Action and the Transformations of the World
Constitutive Process: The Special Problem of Humanitarian Intervention, 11 EUt. J. INT'L L. 3, 9-10
(2000) (describing international law as an "effective but limited constitutive structure").
11. "Hegemony" is the new shibboleth of the international legal literature. See, e.g., Josd E.
Alvarez, Hegemonic International Law Revisited, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 873 (2003); Andreas Paulus, The
War Against Iraq and the Future of International Law: Hegemony or Pluralism?, 25 MICH. J. INT'L L.
691 (2004).
12. See Martti Koskenniemi, "The Lady Doth Protest Too Much": Kosovo, and the Turn to
Ethics in International Law, 65 MOD. L. REv. 159, 160 (2002); see also, e.g., John Quigley, The New
World Order and the Rule of Law, 18 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 75 (1992); Ruti G. Teitel,
Humanity's Law: Rule of Law for the New Global Politics, 35 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 355 (2002); cf
Randall Peerenboom, Human Rights and Rule of Law: What's the Relationship?, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L.
809, 811 (2005) (noting the proliferation of references to the rule of law in international texts).
13. See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, What Happens Now? The United Nations After Iraq, 97 AM.
J. INT'L L. 607, 620 (2003) ("What, then, is the proper role for the lawyer? Surely, it is to stand tall for
the rule of law. ... When the politicians seek to bend the law, the lawyers must insist that they have
broken it. When a faction tries to use power to subvert the rule of law, the lawyer must defend it ....").
14. The United States and other States claimed that the invasion of Iraq was "consistent with
the resolutions of the Security Council" and therefore legal, as a matter of international law. William H.
Taft & Todd F. Buchwald, Preemption, Iraq, and International Law, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 557, 563 (2003).
The claim that the invasion was formally illegal was articulated, of course, by a number of States that
were not members of the coalition, as well as by a number of international lawyers. See, e.g., Sean D.
Murphy, Assessing the Legality ofInvading Iraq, 92 GEO. L.J. 173, 177 (2004) (arguing that "the legal
theory actually deployed by the United States is not persuasive").
15. See, e.g., ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY:
COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS (1995); THOMAS M. FRANCK, THE
POWER OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990); George W. Downs, David M. Rocke & Peter N.
Barsoom, Is the Good News About Compliance Good News About Cooperation?, 50 INT'L ORG. 379
(1996); Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599 (1997)
(review essay). For reviews of this literature, see Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a
Difference?, Ill YALE L.J. 1935, 1942-62 (2002), and Kal Raustiala & Anne-Marie Slaughter,
International Law, International Relations and Compliance, in HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS 538 (Walter Carlsnaes et al. eds., 2002).
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"international culture of compliance." 16 It is no surprise, then, that the
establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC) was international
law's cause cjl~bre during the 1990s and that the ICC continues to be a
central focus of (and occasional litmus test for) scholars, politicians, and
activists today-the ICC, after all, is a symbol for its proponents of a "new
world order based on the rule of international law."0
7
Operational noncompliance-like all forms of noncompliance-does not
fit well within this law and order approach. For those who espouse such a
view, it matters little in the evaluation of a State's acts that the international
legal system contains gaps that hinder its effective operation-what matters is
the formal obedience to the law and multinational processes 8 and particularly
"the attitude of the State to the rule of law."' 19 Most feel that the dangers of
disobedience are just too great. If the international community, for instance,
recognized the unauthorized enforcement of international law, even for good
cause, then, as Prosper Weil put it colorfully, "under the banner of law, chaos
and violence would come to reign among states, and international law would
turn on and rend itself with the loftiest intentions., 20 Simply stated, "[t]he
deficiencies of international law are no excuse for its violation.",21 This
assumption-now ubiquitous in international law scholarship and political
rhetoric-that compliance is sacrosanct and the international rule of law
inviolable was well put recently by Gilbert Guillaume, former Judge and
President of the International Court of Justice, when he asserted that States, as
they fight terrorism, "must..., of course, act in compliance with the law, and
in particular with international law .... That is the underlying condition for
the legitimacy of their action.,
22
16. Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics, Values and Functions, 216 RECUEIL DES
CouRts 9, 86 (1989).
17. Antonio Cassese, On the Current Trends Towards Criminal Prosecution and Punishment
of Breaches of International Humanitarian Law, 9 EUR. J. INT'L L. 2, 8 (1998); see also Kenneth
Anderson, The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines, the Role of International Non-governmental
Organizations and the Idea ofInternational Civil Society, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L. 91, 92 (2000) ("The Rome
Statute ... represents in the minds of its supporters ... the establishment of the rule of law in the
international community ... ").
18. See Nico Krisch, More Equal than the Rest? Hierarchy, Equality and US Predominance in
International Law, in UNITED STATES HEGEMONY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 135,
174 (Michael Byers & Georg Nolte eds., 2003) [hereinafter UNITED STATES HEGEMONY] ("[Tihe mere
fact that some goals that appear desirable under a substantive conception of justice might be achieved
faster and more easily within a hegemonic order does not justify the existence of such an order instead
of a multilateral system based on equality."); see also Vera Gowlland-Debbas, The Limits of Unilateral
Enforcement of Community Objectives in the Framework of UN Peace Maintenance, 11 EUR. J. INT'L L.
361, 379-80 (2000) ("[A] military operation taken in response [to the violations of human rights in
Kosovo] which has laid itself open to accusations of bombardment of towns, attacks against civilian
targets ... surely cannot be considered the best way of promoting the ethical and rule-of-law platform
on which the response was said to be grounded, and it runs the risk of eroding that very platform.").
19. Comments on Chapters 16 and 17, in UNITED STATES HEGEMONY, supra note 18, at 480
(comments of Vaughan Lowe).
20. Prosper Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in International Law?, 77 AM. J. INT'L L.
413, 433 (1983).
21. Brigitte Stem, How To Regulate Globalization?, in THE ROLE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL
POLITICS: ESSAYS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 247, 260 (Michael Byers
ed., 2000).
22. Gilbert Guillaume, Terrorism and International Law, 53 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 537, 548
(2004); cf Ian Brownlie, International Law at the Fiftieth Anniversary of the United Nations, 255
RECUEIL DES CouRS 21, 227 (1995) ("In the case of the Security Council there is no reason to assume a
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This Essay takes issue with the law and order position and contends,
instead, that noncompliance-particularly operational noncompliance-is a
necessary component of less capable legal systems, such as international law.
Though compliance, of course, is and should be the norm, those who discount
operational noncompliance disregard the tension, which is acute in the
international arena, between the necessity in a legal system of maintaining the
principle that the law is to be complied with-because otherwise what does it
mean to be a law?-and the role of noncompliance in developing new law and
in enforcing current law. That operational noncompliance is not the ideal there
is no doubt. Nor is there doubt that many, if not most, instances of operational
noncompliance are unlawful and undesirable. Yet, the failure to acknowledge
the functions and potential benefits of some instances of operational
noncompliance mythologizes contemporary international law, limits our
ability to achieve community policies, and risks making international law
irrelevant. 23 Unless and until we have more effective international institutions,
we will need to come to terms with noncompliance's role in the international
24legal system.
The Essay proceeds as follows: Part II sketches the various causes of
noncompliance and introduces the concept of operational noncompliance. Part
III explains operational noncompliance in detail and provides examples,
showing that operational noncompliance is an integral component of the
international legal system. Part IV looks at the costs and benefits of
operational noncompliance. Part V discusses whether operational
noncompliance should be acknowledged as a component of the international
legal system, and, if so, how we should appraise particular acts of operational
noncompliance. Part VI concludes that we need to come to terms with
noncompliance.
II. THE CAUSES OF NONCOMPLIANCE
The roots of noncompliance are more complicated than scholars often let
on, and it is important to disaggregate them if we are to understand
noncompliance's role in the international legal system. 25 To this end, we can
tension between effectiveness and legality. Common sense would suggest that the authority of a political
organ must depend on respect for the Rule of Law and that there is an essential link between operational
efficiency and legality.").
23. There are other forms of noncompliance, such as efficient breach, that some consider
beneficial, but which are not considered here. Compare, e.g., Warren F. Schwartz & Alan 0. Sykes, The
Economic Structure of Renegotiation and Dispute Resolution in the World Trade Organization, 31 J.
LEGAL STUD. S 179 (2002), with John H. Jackson, International Law Status of WTO Dispute Settlement
Reports: Obligation To Comply or Option To "Buy Out"?, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 109 (2004).
24. But cf Bruno Simma, International Crimes: Injury and Countermeasures: Comments on
Part 2 of the ILC Work on State Responsibility, in INTERNATIONAL CRIMES OF STATE: A CRITICAL
ANALYSIS OF THE ILC's DRAFT ARTICLE 19 ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY 283, 315 (Joseph H. H. Weiler et
al. eds., 1989) ("[1]t is a reason for concern that these new conceptions [of community interest] are being
grafted upon international law without support through, and any attempt at, adequate institution-
building.").
25. See Comments on Chapters 16 and 17, supra note 19, at 479-80 (comments of Vaughan
Lowe) (noting great differences between types of noncompliant acts and claiming that "[w]e need to
take these crucial differences into account in evaluating non-compliance").
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look at the causes of noncompliance at three levels: the individual, the
communal, and the structural.
On the surface, noncompliance is simply a function of the wrongdoer's
ability and will-that is, the wrongdoing State's capacity or incapacity to
comply with the law, as well as its desire to comply. Incapacity can be based
on several factors: ambiguity in the rules themselves, as with the question of
whether the International Court of Justice's provisional measures orders were
binding;26 limitations on the State's ability to take actions necessary to obey
the rule, such as financial or technological deficiencies, as in the incapability
of a number of States to satisfy the Montreal Protocol's chlorofluorocarbon
consumption reporting requirements; 27 or, more simply, a mistake or a lack of
intention to disobey, as with the United States's breaches of the consular
information and notification requirements of the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations.28 Capacity-based noncompliance, or what might be better
described as intentional noncompliance, on the other hand, results from a
State's willful decision to violate the law, which is based on the State's
calculation of its interests, a complicated amalgam of advantages and
disadvantages, costs and benefits, particular to, among other things, the
primary rules, participants, and facts involved at any one moment.29
But noncompliance is often rooted in more than an individual State's
capacities and whims; it is grounded as well in numerous second-order
conditions-in inadequacies in how the international community creates,
internalizes, and manages the rules. For example, there could be substantive
and procedural flaws in the creation of legal norms that impinge on the rules'
fairness and legitimacy. 30 There could also be deficiencies in norm
internationalization, in the transnational legal process (as Harold Koh calls it),
that reduce the likelihood that governments will feel constrained to obey the
rules. 31 There could be, as well, failures in norm management that undercut
cooperation and persuasion, thereby loosening the bonds and
interdependencies that induce compliance.32 And there could be defects in
acculturation, "the general process of adopting the beliefs and behavioral
patterns of the surrounding culture." 33 In these ways, the international
26. Only in 2001 did the Court decide that such orders were binding. See LaGrand Case
(F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27).
27. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 15, at 14-15; cf U.N. Charter art. 19 (allowing the
U.N. General Assembly to permit a member state to vote even if that state is in arrears "if [the General
Assembly] is satisfied that the failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the control of the Member").
28. In the Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, the United States
admitted that in that case it breached the Convention's requirement that it inform detained foreign
nationals without delay of their right to notify their consulates of their detention, but the United States
indicated to the court that the breach was not deliberate. See Case Concerning the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations (Para. v. U.S.), 1998 I.C.J. 248, 253 (Apr. 9). On incapacity generally, see, for
example, CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 15, at 13-15.
29. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 3, at 69-73; Jack L. Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner,
International Agreements: A Rational Choice Approach, 44 VA. J. INT'L L. 113 (2003); Jack L.
Goldsmith & Eric A. Posner, A Theory of Customary International Law, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1113
(1999); Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1823
(2002).
30. See FRANCK, supra note 15.
31. See Koh, supra note 15.
32. See CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 15.
33. Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How To Influence States: Socialization and International
Noncompliance
community creates the background conditions that permit or create the
environment for noncompliance. Without the establishment of these enabling
conditions, some, though not all, acts of noncompliance would never take
place.
There is, finally, a third plane of noncompliance beyond those of the
incapacity and will of individual States and the inadequacies of the
international community in persuading States to accept the rules and
acculturating States to conform to the rules. Noncompliance can also be
based, on occasion, in the international system's structural inability to
maintain and enforce international law and to control international institutions.
Such operational gaps can provide opportunities for noncompliance in at least
two ways: by reducing the risk that noncompliant acts will be punished, thus
altering a State's cost-benefit calculus, or by inducing States to step in to
ensure the operation of the system-the technique of "operational
noncompliance." As with community-based preconditions, noncompliance
founded in the structure of the international system does not cause
noncompliance in any proximate sense. It simply provides openings for
noncompliant acts that otherwise may or may not be committed depending on
other factors transpiring at that moment. Consequently, operational
noncompliance requires both the existence of an operational gap in the
international legal system, as well as an interest by a State or group of States
to take an action in violation of international law that bridges that gap.
III. OPERATIONAL NONCOMPLIANCE
Operational noncompliance, thus, fills the gaps created when the legal
system itself will not or cannot act. That the international legal system
contains such operational gaps is well-known. And that these gaps appear in
all aspects of the international system-in lawmaking and law termination, in
law enforcement, and in institutional control-is also evident.
Given the gaps in the operation of the international legal system, States
occasionally take it upon themselves, individually and collectively, to fill
these gaps through their own actions, when it is in their self-interest.34 As a
default, States attempt to fill operational gaps through legal acts, and this is
uncontroversial. Such legal acts include acts authorized by treaties (such as
Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621, 638 (2004).
34. See, e.g., W. MICHAEL REISMAN & GAYL S. WESTERMAN, STRAIGHT BASELINES IN
MARITIME BOUNDARY DELIMITATION 226 (1992) ("Quantitatively, the key international event in the
formation and change of normative arrangements continues to be the precipitating act of a state seeking
to serve its own interests and the counter-reactions of states who believe that the action prejudices rights
and interests to which they are entitled."); Discussion, in THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT: NEW SCENARIOS-NEW LAW? 154, 171 (Jost Delbrflck ed., 1993) (comments of W.
Michael Reisman) ("No one in the world... is altruistic. Everyone is motivated by self-interest. When
there has been a humanitarian intervention to stop gross violations of human rights, the critical question
is not the motive of the party that intervened. The question is the gravity of the evil that the intervenor
has addressed and whether it is removed at that particular moment. The motive is not critical."). Given
that these acts are based on the self-interest of States, responses to similar situations, such as human
rights abuses, will inevitably be dissimilar and selective. See Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Inevitability of
Selective Response? Principles To Guide Urgent International Action, in Kosovo AND THE CHALLENGE
OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: SELECTIVE INDIGNATION, COLLECTIVE ACTION, AND INTERNATIONAL
CITIZENSHIP 405 (Albrecht Schnabel & Ramesh Thakur eds., 2000).
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retaliatory measures under trade agreements) and the suspension of non-
mandatory acts (such as the suspension of foreign aid). Legal acts, however,
are not always available or effective. When they are not, States may feel
compelled, in certain circumstances, to resort to formally illegal acts in order
to achieve their goals. Such gap filling through noncompliance, though not the
norm in international relations, is not unusual either. Indeed, not surprisingly,
it often happens in some of the most important situations confronting the
international system-in crises in which international institutions, as presently
constituted, cannot or will not act. Some examples from the three areas noted
above-lawmaking and law termination, law enforcement, and institutional
control-demonstrate how and when operational noncompliance occurs, and,
therefore, how operational noncompliance has had a role-often a critical
role-in the effective functioning of the international legal system. None of
these examples is particularly obscure, but putting them together, as they
rarely, if ever, are, provides us with a portrait of the international legal system
that highlights the centrality of operational noncompliance.
35
A. Lawmaking and Law Termination
Operational noncompliance in the area of lawmaking and law
termination occurs most often as a result of a change in a fundamental
assumption upon which a rule is based.36 Thus, for example, an existing rule
might have been founded on some previous conception of technological
feasibility, a conception that has since become antiquated.37
Since States, as a default, prefer not to violate international law, they
will first attempt to change the rule legally, through the reinterpretation of the
rule, the termination of the rule, or the negotiation of a new rule. The
mechanisms and possibilities for superseding the old rule will differ according
to the form of the rule and the extent of the proposed change. Reinterpretation
35. International law scholars have treated these three areas of operational noncompliance
separately. The author is unaware of other papers that view them as a single conceptual phenomenon.
36. Scholars have acknowledged, often reluctantly, the role of noncompliance in international
lawmaking and law termination. See, e.g., ANTHONY A. D'AMATO, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 98 (1971) ("Each deviation contains the seeds of a new rule."); FRANCK, supra
note 15, at 151; HENKIN, supra note 3, at 42; MARTrI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE
STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 402-03 (1989); Michael Akehurst, Custom as a
Source of International Law, 47 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 1, 8 (1974-1975) ("There is no doubt that
customary rules can be changed in this way, but the process is hardly one to be recommended by anyone
who wishes to strengthen the rule of law in international relations."); Jonathan I. Charney, Anticipatory
Humanitarian Intervention in Kosovo, 93 Am. J. INT'L L. 834, 836 (1999) ("[Gleneral international law
may change through breach of the current law and the development of new state practice and opinio
juris supporting the change."). Others, especially recently, have criticized this method of lawmaking, see
Michael Byers & Simon Chesterman, Changing the Rules About Rules? Unilateral Humanitarian
Intervention and the Future of International Law, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL,
AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 177, 188 (J.K. Holzgrefe & Robert 0. Keohane eds., 2003) [hereinafter
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION], while still others have embraced it, see Allen Buchanan, Reforming the
International Law of Humanitarian Intervention, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra, at 130. See
also Robert E. Goodin, Toward an International Rule of Law: Distinguishing International Law-
Breakers from Would-Be Law-Makers, 9 J. ETHICS 225 (2005); Paul B. Stephan, Creative Destruction-
Idiosyncratic Claims of International Law and the Helms-Burton Legislation, 27 STETSON L. REV. 1341
(1998).
37. Cf Paul Gewirtz, Constitutional Law and New Technology, 64 Soc. RES. 1191 (1997).
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is possible if the old rule is sufficiently opaque, which is often the case.38
Creative reinterpretation, though, is limited by the text setting out the rule, as
well as past practice, so that at some point the line between reinterpretation
and renegotiation (and, indeed, violation) is crossed. If the rule is located in a
treaty, then it is usually possible to terminate the treaty with notice,39 though
States may be reluctant to do so if the treaty contains other, more important
provisions or time does not allow for the provision of adequate notice. If the
rule is based on custom, however, termination, as such, is unavailable. With
regard to both conventional and customary law, negotiation of a new rule to
supplant the old rule is possible, but there is no guarantee that such
negotiations would end successfully (especially in cases of multilateral
negotiations where consensus is difficult to achieve), no certainty that
negotiations would conclude within a particular timeframe, and certainly no
assurance, particularly in the case of custom, that the agreement entered into
would apply generally. The difficulties inherent in reaching consensus on a
new rule apply even to the many modern treaty regimes that have developed
creative techniques-through institutions such as conferences of the parties-
that allow for some self-modification short of formal amendments. °°
Consequently, in cases in which time is a factor or in situations in which
consensus (as to reinterpretation or renegotiation) is unachievable-that is, in
situations in which the international legal system, because of its decentralized
lawmaking process, cannot accommodate current or developing conceptions
of lawfulness-States may feel compelled to violate the existing rule, as it
may be the only way to change the rule. In such circumstances, violation
begins a process of claim and counterclaim, action and reaction, which leads
to the rejection of the formally illegal act or, conversely, its ratification
through the revision, clarification, or termination of the previous rule.41 As the
Supreme Court of Chile recognized in 1955, "a change in a norm ... may
arise from its violation by a State, when the custom does not conform to new
needs. ,42
Such operational noncompliance was the most important factor in the
development of the international law of the sea during the twentieth century, a
story that is well-known.4 As technologies developed for the use of oil, gas,
38. See Felice Morgenstern, Legality in International Organizations, 48 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L.
241, 253-54 (1976-1977). On interpretation through performance, see W. Michael Reisman, Necessary
and Proper: Executive Competence To Interpret Treaties, 15 YALE J. INT'L L. 316 (1990).
39. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 56, opened for signature May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1970).
40. See, e.g., Robin R. Churchill & Geir Ulfstein, Autonomous Institutional Arrangements in
Multilateral Environmental Agreements: A Little-Noticed Phenomenon in International Law, 94 AM. J.
INT'L L. 623 (2000).
41. Of course, this process only works if States have an interest in engaging the initial claim.
See REISMAN & WESTERMAN, supra note 34, at 202.
42. Lauritzen v. Chile, 23 I.L.R. 708, 711 (Sup. Ct. Chile 1955); see also Military and
Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 109 (June 27) ("Reliance by a State on a novel
right or an unprecedented exception to the principle might, if shared in principle by other States, tend
towards a modification of customary international law."); cf The Scotia, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 170, 187
(1871) ("Many of the usages which prevail [in the international system], and which have the force of
law, doubtless originated in the positive prescriptions of some single state, which were at frst of limited
effect, but which when generally accepted became of universal obligation.").
43. See generally HENKIN, supra note 3, at 212-18.
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and other natural resources and their mining in the oceans, demands increased
for the seaward expansion of coastal state jurisdiction and sovereignty. 4
States economically dependent on fishing in their adjacent waters also sought
such expansion in order to protect their national industries and food supplies.
These claims, often in violation of established law, led to the revision of the
law of the sea in a number of respects, two examples of which follow.
This process took place initially and most rapidly with regard to the
continental shelf-the seabed and subsoil adjacent to the territorial sea down
to a certain depth below sea level. In September 1945, the United States was
one of the first states to assert a unilateral claim to rights regarding "its"
continental shelf. 4 Thereafter, similar claims by other States quickly
proliferated, and this led to the codification of the continental shelf regime in
the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf,46 which the International Court
of Justice eleven years later described as "reflecting, or as crystallizing,
received or at least emergent rules of customary international law."4 7 As one
scholar concluded, "In general, the view was widespread among
[contemporary] writers that the continental shelf doctrine did entail some
modification of existing rules of international law." But, that scholar
continued, "it appears from the writings of jurists that they generally did not
consider such a change in the existing law a bar to the emergence of a new
customary rule as long as the disturbance in the established order was of a
lesser impact than the public good derived from the change.
'"A8
To take a second example, following the Second World War, States
began to claim jurisdiction over waters beyond their territorial sea and into the
high seas-the area of the oceans open to all States. 49 This was done despite
the recognition that "the legal situation [in the early 1950s] appeared to be that
the unilateral extension by a coastal State of its sovereignty over areas of the
44. See REISMAN & WESTERMAN, supra note 34, at 19-20.
45. See Policy of the United States with Respect to the Natural Resources of the Subsoil and
Sea Bed of the Continental Shelf, Proclamation No. 2667, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,303 (Sept. 28, 1945) (Truman
Proclamation).
46. Convention on the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, 499 U.N.T.S. 311.
The extent of the continental shelf was expanded in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention. See United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, art. 76, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S.
397 (entered into force Nov. 16, 1994) [hereinafter UNCLOS].
47. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (F.R.G./Den.; F.R.G./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 39 (Feb.
20) (emphasis added).
48. ZDENEK J. SLOUKA, INTERNATIONAL CUSTOM AND THE CONTINENTAL SHELF: A STUDY IN
THE DYNAMICS OF CUSTOMARY RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 32 (1968); see also Petroleum
Development Ltd. v. Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, 18 I.L.R. 144 (Lord Asquith, Umpire 1951) (noting the
novelty of claims over the continental shelf in 1951, that these claims were in opposition to the law as it
had been, and that they had not become law as of that date); Rudolf Bernhardt, Custom and Treaty in the
Law of the Sea, 205 RECUEIL DES COuRS 247, 291 (1987) ("[I]t was very doubtful whether the claims
made [by the United States in 1945] were compatible with the international law of that time."); James
Crawford & Thomas Viles, International Law on a Given Day, in VOLKERRECHT ZWISCHEN
NORMATIVEM ANSPRUCH UND POLITISCHER REALITAT 45, 62 (Konrad Ginther et al. eds., 1994) ("[T]he
State Department fully understood that the United States was undertaking a new practice that was not
consistent with current norms."). But see Daniel Bodansky, Non Liquet and the Incompleteness of
International Law, in INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AND NUCLEAR
WEAPONS 153, 157 (Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Philippe Sands eds., 2000) (arguing that there
was a "gap in the law.., which the Truman Proclamation sought to fill").
49. See Bernhardt, supra note 48, at 294. See generally DAVID JOSEPH ATTARD, THE
EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-31 (1987).
Noncompliance
high seas constituted an unlawful act.",50 Given its economic dependence on
fishing, Iceland was one of the States that most actively expanded its
exclusive seaward fishing jurisdiction. 51 This it did in violation of its
obligations under general international law, as well as particular bilateral
agreements. Iceland, however, was unashamed of its actions. In a pamphlet
issued in 1972, Iceland claimed that "[u]nilateral action in questions of
fisheries and territorial limits is the last resort a coastal state or an island state
has if the international community is unable to find a satisfactory solution to
such problems by agreeing on uniform rules in terms of international law."
52
In Iceland's view, such action would lead to the "progressive evolution of the
international law of the sea."53 Iceland's claims were given qualified support
by the International Court of Justice in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Cases,54 and
many States followed Iceland's lead in the 1970s, just as they had followed
the U.S. example in the 1950s with regard to the continental shelf. 55 These
deviations from the customary rule were largely codified in the 1982 United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea in its provisions on the Exclusive
Economic Zone.56
These are just two examples from one area of the law, but other
examples from other areas-from the law of war,57 for instance-would serve
to make the same point. Noncompliance has been a central part of the
international lawmaking and law-terminating processes, allowing international
law to maintain its continued relevance despite the absence of effective
institutions.
B. Law Enforcement
Gap filling through noncompliance is also apparent in the area of law
enforcement, that is, in the application of law. 58 The need for
countermeasures, as such acts are termed, is clear-the international legal
system has no effective centralized law enforcement mechanism, the Security
Council notwithstanding, and thus a State may need to resort to acts that are
otherwise unlawful in order to enforce an obligation it is owed ("individual
countermeasures"). 59 Such self-help measures are needed, certainly, by an
50. WINSTON CONRAD EXTAVOUR, THE EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE: A STUDY OF THE
EVOLUTION AND PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 89 (1979);
accord ATrARD, supra note 49, at 6-7.
51. See, e.g., Resolution of the Althing on Fisheries Jurisdiction, Feb. 15, 1972, 11 I.L.M. 643
(Ice.).
52. GOV'T OF ICELAND, ICELAND AND THE LAW OF THE SEA 12 (1972).
53. Id. at 13.
54. Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 3 (July 25); Fisheries Jurisdiction (F.R.G.
v. Ice.), 1974 I.C.J. 175 (July 25); see also EXTAVOUR, supra note 50, at 294. See generally Richard B.
Bilder, The Anglo-Icelandic Fisheries Dispute, 1973 WIs. L. REV. 37.
55. See Bernhardt, supra note 48, at 294.
56. See UNCLOS, supra note 46, arts. 55-57.
57. See, e.g., W. Michael Reisman, Assessing Claims To Revise the Laws of War, 97 AM. J.
INT'L L. 82 (2003); cf John Yoo, Using Force, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 729 (2004) (proposing a revision to
the rules regarding the use of force in self-defense).
58. See generally LINOS-ALEXANDRE SICILIANOS, LES RIACTIONS DtCENTRALIStES
L'ILLICITE: DES CONTRE-MESURES A LA LtGITIME DtFENSE (1990); ZOLLER, supra note 4.
59. See, e.g., Case Concerning the Air Service Agreement of 27 March 1946 Between the
United States of America and France, 18 R.I.A.A. 417, 443-45 (1978).
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injured State, 60 but they have also been maintained by third States, principally,
in three circumstances. First, such "collective countermeasures" have been
used when the injured State is unable to coerce the wrongdoing State into
abiding by its obligations. In this situation, countermeasures by third States
may be necessary lest weak states' rights become worthless. 61 Second,
collective countermeasures have been used when the international obligation
owed and breached is not to another State but to a State's own nationals. Here,
the injured party-individuals-may not be able to enforce the international
obligation, and thus third States need to be enlisted to assist in the
enforcement of the international obligation. And third, countermeasures are
maintained when the breach is of an obligation that is of general interest to
States, such as when Iran breached the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations during the Iran Hostage Crisis. 62 In these three cases, where
international law's traditional bilateralism breaks down, 63 third States have
taken unlawful acts to enforce an international obligation when other, legal
acts are unavailable or ineffective.64
Unsurprisingly, such collective countermeasures have increased as
States have become more committed to the substantive prescriptions of
international law. It is also unsurprising that breaches of human rights
obligations have generated the greatest response from States in the form of
countermeasures. Such acts are based on two of the three rationales for third
party intervention-that the obligation owed is to individuals who cannot
vindicate their rights because those rights are being violated by their own
government, and that the rights in question are of general interest to the
international community.
The humanitarian intervention in Kosovo is the most recent and
dramatic example of this phenomenon. After various legal means of coercion
failed and before NATO resorted to the use of force in violation of the UN
Charter, less extreme measures were taken in violation of formal international
law in order to convince Yugoslavia to discontinue its infringement of
international human rights law. For example, the European Community (EC),
in Regulation 1901/98, instituted an immediate flight ban on Yugoslav
airlines, 65 and the implementation of this regulation by those EC member
60. See, e.g., John Norton Moore, Enhancing Compliance with International Law: A
Neglected Remedy, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 881 (1991).
61. See ELLERY C. STOWELL, INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 46-49 (1921).
62. See Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v.
Iran), 1980 I.C.J. 3, 43 (May 24) ("[T]he Court considers it to be its duty to draw the attention of the
entire international community... to the irreparable harm that may be caused by events of the kind now
before the Court. Such events cannot fail to undermine the edifice of law... the maintenance of which
is vital for the security and well-being of the [international community] .... ").
63. On the bilateral tradition, see Simma, supra note 24, at 283-84.
64. See generally Michael Akehurst, Reprisals by Third States, 44 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. I
(1970); Jonathan I. Charney, Third State Remedies in International Law, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 57 (1989);
Frowein, supra note 5; D.N. Hutchinson, Solidarity and Breaches of Multinational Treaties, 59 BRIT.
Y.B. INT'L L. 151 (1988); Martti Koskenniemi, Solidarity Measures: State Responsibility as a New
International Order?, 72 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 337, 355-56 (2001); Bruno Simma, From Bilateralism to
Community Interest in International Law, 250 RECUEIL DES CouRs 217 (1994).
65. See Council Regulation (EC) No. 1901/98, Concerning a Ban on Flights of Yugoslav
Carriers Between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the European Community, art.l, 1998 O.J. (L
248) 1.
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states that had bilateral aviation agreements with Yugoslavia (France,
Germany, and the United Kingdom) constituted breaches of those
66agreements. As the mandatory notice period required for the termination of
treaties had not run, Yugoslavia quite accurately described the immediate
suspension of these agreements as illegal.67 In explaining why the United
Kingdom was disregarding the normal rules concerning the termination of
treaties, British Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
Robin Cook stated that "there [is] always a balance to be struck between our
legal obligation under [the aviation agreement] and the need to bring
[Yugoslav President] Milosevic to comply with his obligations. 68 Milosevic's
"behaviour [by September 1998], and in particular his worsening record on
human rights, means that, on moral and political grounds, he has forfeited the
right of his Government to insist upon the 12 months notice which would
normally apply [to the termination of treaties]." 69 Eventually, of course, when
all other means failed, legal and illegal, including the failure to obtain Security
Council authorization for the use of force, NATO resorted to the most extreme
strategy available-military intervention in formal violation of the law-to
ensure the enforcement of Yugoslavia's international human rights
obligations.
Again, other examples might be given,70 but this should be sufficient to
establish the role of noncompliance in the application of international law.7 1
C. Institutional Control
Finally, operational noncompliance also takes the form of institutional
control. In the absence of effective outside oversight and judicial review of the
acts of international organizations, it is left to the institutions themselves to
regulate the legality and effectiveness of their own activities. Such self-
regulation can be pathological, and, consequently, individual members of
these organizations are often left to fill the gaps created by the absence of
effective mechanisms of institutional control. As with lawmaking and law
enforcement, there is a spectrum of legal means States may employ in such
circumstances, the most extreme of which is withdrawal from the
66. See Agreement Concerning Air Services, art. 17, U.K.-Yugo., Feb. 3, 1959, 359 U.N.T.S.
339 (requiring a twelve-month notice period prior to termination of the agreement); Air Transport
Agreement, art. 18, Fr.-Yugo., Mar. 23, 1967, 922 U.N.T.S. 59 (same); Air Transport Agreement, art.
21, F.R.G.-Yugo., Apr. 10, 1957, 463 U.N.T.S. 269 (same).
67. See Statement of the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the
Suspension of Flights of Yugoslav Airlines, quoted in International Law Commission, Draft Articles on
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in Report of the International Law
Commission, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10 at 353, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (Oct. 30, 2001)
[hereinafter Draft Articles].
68. United Kingdom Materials on International Law 1999, 70 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 387, 555
(1999).
69. United Kingdom Materials on International Law 1998, 69 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 433, 581
(1998).
70. For additional examples, see Draft Articles, supra note 67, at 350-55.
71. The International Law Commission has recommended rules governing individual
countermeasures, but was unable to agree on rules regarding collective countermeasures. For a review,
see David J. Bederman, Counterintuiting Countermeasures, 96 Am. J. INT'L L. 817 (2002); Edith Brown
Weiss, Invoking State Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 798 (2002).
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organization, 72 but if the stakes are high enough and the organization
important enough, exit will be unavailable and formally illegal means may
need to be employed instead.
Such gap-filling through noncompliance as institutional control occurs
primarily in two circumstances. First, such acts of control manifest themselves
through noncompliance with allegedly ultra vires decisions of the
organization. Thus, a State could withhold its assessed contributions 73 from
the organization-in violation of its obligation to pay dues--on the grounds
that it refuses to support financially an ultra vires decision, as was the view of
France and the Soviet Union with regard to UN operations in the Congo and
the Middle East in the Expenses Case before the International Court of
Justice.74 Second, a State may be motivated to violate its obligations as a
member state by its desire to reform the organization's operations, thereby
making the organization more effective, as when the United States withheld a
75portion of its assessed contributions to the United Nations. In each case, a
State violates its obligations under international law in order to act as an
institutional control when lawful controls are unavailable or ineffective. As
with the other forms of operational noncompliance, noncompliance as
institutional control fills an important gap in the international system.
D. Operational Noncompliance and the Informal Legal System
This quick review of operational noncompliance makes clear that States,
when it is in their interests, breach international law in situations in which the
international legal system does not or cannot operate effectively. By doing so,
States act in a variety a ways-as lawmakers, as law enforcers, and as
institutional checks-that are the responsibility of government institutions in
highly developed legal systems. As an initial matter, then, one can say that,
descriptively, operational noncompliance has been a part of the international
legal system, as the actions of States in these cases serve functions-
fundamental functions-that are characteristic of legal systems. This is not an
insubstantial claim, as any understanding of a legal regime must take into
account the actual operation of the system, including its informal processes.
76
72. For example, the United States withdrew from the International Labour Organization in
1977 (rejoining in 1980) and UNESCO in 1984 (rejoining in 2003). On the idea of control mechanisms,
see generally W. MICHAEL REISMAN, SYSTEMS OF CONTROL IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION AND
ARBITRATION: BREAKDOWN AND REPAIR 1-3 (1992).
73. See U.N. Charter art. 17, para. 2. ("The expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the
Members as apportioned by the General Assembly.").
74. Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2 of the Charter), Advisory
Opinion, 1962 I.C.J. 151 (July 20). The ICJ rejected the French and Soviet views. For a defense of such
practice in certain cases, see Francesco Francioni, Multilateralism d la Carte: The Limits to Unilateral
Withholdings ofAssessed Contributions to the UN Budget, 11 EuR. J. INT'L L. 43 (2000).
75. See generally Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law:
Agreement on UN Financial and Structural Reforms, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 387, 389 (Sean D. Murphy ed.,
2001); Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International Law: Payment of US.
Arrears to the United Nations, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 348 (Sean D. Murphy ed., 2000). Compare Jose E.
Alvarez, Legal Remedies and the United Nations' a la Carte Problem, 12 MICH. J. INT'L L. 229 (1991),
with Elisabeth Zoller, The "Corporate Will" of the United Nations and the Rights of the Minority, 81
AM. J. INT'L L. 610 (1987).
76. Cf KADISH & KADISH, supra note 2, at 146.
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IV. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF OPERATIONAL NONCOMPLIANCE
Thus far, this Essay has confined itself to a description of the
constitutive processes of the international legal system that demonstrates the
central role played by operational noncompliance in the absence of effective
international institutions. This description has hinted at the constructive
functions that acts of operational noncompliance can serve, but in order to
understand these functions more fully, a more theoretical discussion is in
order. Such a discussion will not only appreciate the benefits of
noncompliance, it will also tally the costs of noncompliance. First the costs
and then the benefits of operational noncompliance.77
A. The Costs of Operational Noncompliance
The costs of operational noncompliance, like the costs of all forms of
noncompliance, can be two-fold--costs to the primary rule breached and costs
to the principle of the international rule of law.
First, and most obviously, a breach of an international legal obligation
can diminish the authority of the obligation itself. This might not be of
concern to the breaching State, at least in the short-term,7 but it will probably
be of concern to the State to which the obligation is owed and probably be of
concern as well (in the case of multilateral obligations) to non-breaching
States that support or rely upon the obligation breached, even if they are not
directly harmed by the particular breach at issue.
Second, noncompliance can impede the establishment and maintenance
of the international rule of law.79 This it can do in two ways. Noncompliance
impinges on the principle that power must be exercised in accordance with the
law, a principle that might be especially dear in our current unipolar world.
Noncompliance also undercuts the establishment of a habit of obedience or
the creation of what has been called "compliance pull" 80 or "obedience
effect."81 As Louis Henkin wrote, "[i]f diplomacy can maintain a climate of
77. That is, costs and benefits to the system as a whole, not to individual States.
78. Sometimes States will violate international law (because of the necessities of the moment)
but have no interest in diminishing the long-term value of the rule violated. In these instances, they are
either willing to pay the price of noncompliance or seek a one-time exemption from the applicability of
the rule.
79. The rule-of-law principle discussed here is the fairly basic and untextured one of legality.
On the variety of meanings of the rule of law, see, for example, Richard H. Fallon, Jr., "The Rule of
Law" as a Concept in Constitutional Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1997). A substantive conception
of the rule of law might cut the other way. See generally Kim Lane Scheppele, When the Law Doesn't
Count: The 2000 Election and the Failure of the Rule of Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1361, 1377 (2001)
("[T]he rule of law as a principle of the new constitutionalism [elaborated by constitutional courts
outside the United States] has started to recognize that legality alone does not entail legitimacy and that
the faithful operation of law itself is no excuse for abuses that occur in law's name.").
80. FRANCK, supra note 15, at 24.
81. DUNCAN KENNEDY, A CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION: FIN DE SIECLE 63 (1997). For a
critique of the idea that noncompliance undermines the system as a whole because it disrupts habit
formation, see Systemic Costs of Non-Compliance with International Law-Effects on the System and on
Interstate Relations, in CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW ISSUES: SHARING PAN-EUROPEAN AND
AMERICAN PERSPECTIVES, PROCEEDINGS OF THE JOINT CONFERENCE HELD IN THE HAGUE, THE
NETHERLANDS, JULY 4-6, 1991, at 65, 71-72 (1992) (remarks of W. Michael Reisman). For a critique of
the idea that noncompliance jeopardizes multilateralism, both generally and in specific areas of
cooperation, see George W. Downs & Andrea W. Trento, Conceptual Issues Surrounding the
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order and provide lawful means for achieving change, these will induce the
acceptance of law and the development of institutions for its observance.
Habits of accepting and observing law will, in turn, contribute to international
order and stability." 82 Thus, any breach of an international obligation can
undermine not only the authority of the primary rule breached but also the
authority and integrity of the international legal system itself because it
undermines the assumption that states must comply with international law.
Consequently, all States, even States that are not a party to the primary
obligation breached, might have an interest in compliance because
noncompliance affects the stability of the international system as a whole.
As is apparent, the costs of noncompliance can, at least as a theoretical
matter, be significant. Not only can they be significant as a matter of the
primary rule breached, more importantly they can also be significant in terms
of the maintenance of the rule of law. Now, certainly, the costs of any
particular breach will vary according to the nature of the breach and the
primary rule at issue. Thus, we will probably worry more about violations of
rules regarding the use of force than about violations of other rules. And the
costs of the breach will also depend on the strength of the rule-of-law
principle jn the system. Thus, conceivably, we might worry more about the
rule-of-law effects of a breach in the international arena than we do in the
domestic arena precisely because the international rule of law is more insecure
than its domestic counterpart and, consequently, in greater need of
reinforcement.
B. The Benefits of Operational Noncompliance
If one is categorically committed to the international rule of law, then
there is no need to proceed any further-all acts of noncompliance are to be
condemned no matter the circumstances and no matter the benefits that may
result. But for those who do not think in this fashion, operational
noncompliance may provide two types of benefits, each mirroring one of
noncompliance's costs: benefits to the primary rule created or enforced and
benefits that stem from the effective promotion and enforcement of the
international legal system's substantive policies.
First, there is the benefit in maintaining the integrity of the particular
primary rule (in the cases of law enforcement and institutional control) or in
nourishing the establishment of the nascent primary rule proposed (in the case
of lawmaking). Depending on the particular case, such benefits may
correspond to or be greater or lesser than the costs accrued as a result of the
violation of the primary rule. It depends on the relative values of the
competing rules.
Second, just as there are competing primary rules often involved in
operational noncompliance, so too are there competing systemic principles-
that of maintaining the international rule of law and that of maintaining the
Compliance Gap, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND ORGANIZATION: CLOSING THE COMPLIANCE GAP 19, 25-
26 (Edward C. Luck & Michael W. Doyle eds., 2004).
82. HENKIN, supra note 3, at 317.
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operation of the international legal system (the "operational principle"). The
operational principle has two primary benefits.
There is the benefit stemming from the efficient functioning of the
international system itself. International law is all very well and good, but it is
only useful-and it is only really law-if it actually has effect. Excessive
adherence to the rule of law can lead to a breakdown in the system itself if
strict adherence means, paradoxically, the non-enforcement of the rules or the
inability to update the rules. As Elihu Root stated ninety years ago with regard
to the enforcement of international law, "[i]nternational laws violated with
impunity must soon cease to exist, and every State has a direct interest in
preventing those violations which, if permitted to continue, would destroy the
law.",8 3 By maintaining the functionality of the international law, operational
noncompliance ensures that the international legal system retains its
effectiveness.
Operational noncompliance is also important to maintaining the
continued relevance of international law. Legal regimes that are out of date or
no longer fit political and social realities become obsolete or irrelevant unless
they can be tweaked or transformed to change with the times.8 4 If States or
international institutions are unwilling or unable to recognize the evolution of
contemporary international policies, operational noncompliance can bypass
the formal system, ensuring that international law reflects such change.
Noncompliance's benefits are evident, as are its costs. And just as with
the costs of noncompliance, operational noncompliance's benefits will vary
with the nature of the breach and the primary rule at issue. The benefits of the
breach will also depend on the sophistication of the legal system. Thus, the
benefits of operational noncompliance will be greater in a less effective legal
system, such as international law, than in a sophisticated legal system where
the operational principle is structurally strong. Operational noncompliance's
importance will also vary within a legal regime, especially one as fragmented
as international law, as some parts of the regime may be more inherently
operational than others. Thus, acts of operational noncompliance are more
likely to occur when an obligation is binding on large numbers of States-for
example, in the cases of customary law (such as the law of the sea as
described above) or a multilateral treaty regime-because such obligations are
more difficult to modify. On the other hand, operational noncompliance will
be less frequent in areas of the international legal system in which there are
workable institutions that allow for legal change (for example, the WTO
system), or law enforcement, or in which there are respected compulsory
adjudication mechanisms that allow judges or arbitrators to alter and adapt the
rules through interpretation (see the WTO system again).
83. Elihu Root, The Outlookfor International Law, PROC. AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. 2, 9 (1915); see
also 1 L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 13-14 (H. Lauterpacht ed., 8th ed. 1955) (footnote omitted)
("Self-help, and intervention on the part of other States which sympathise with the wronged one, are the
means by which the rules of the Law of Nations can be and actually are enforced.").
84. Cf Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEx. L. REV. 1399, 1440 (2005) (testing the
"notion that specific instances of legal rules, practices, and decisions that clash with commonsense
notions ofjustice can promote widespread lawbreaking" and finding a correlation in certain cases).
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V. ACKNOWLEDGING AND APPRAISING OPERATIONAL NONCOMPLIANCE
As is apparent, there can be substantial benefits associated with
operational noncompliance, though significant costs as well. It should be
clear, though, that noncompliance is necessary to the effective functioning and
the continued relevance of the international legal system. Even if this is so,
should operational noncompliance be acknowledged as a component of the
international legal system? If so, how should we appraise acts of operational
noncompliance?
A. Acknowledging Operational Noncompliance
Should the role of operational noncompliance be openly acknowledged?
Wouldn't it be better, instead, to maintain the myth of the international rule of
law, despite obvious examples to the contrary? Wouldn't doing otherwise
encourage noncompliant acts and undermine the reputation of international
law, precisely the opposite of what our aim should be?
85
Indeed, this might be an appropriate strategy in domestic legal systems,
but in the international legal system, it falls short. States, by virtue of their
role as participants in the constitutive processes of the international system,
are well aware of the functions that noncompliance plays, and, consequently,
rule-of-law rhetoric does not have the same effect internationally that it can
have domestically. Propagating a myth will not serve as an effective deterrent
to lawbreaking, and such a strategy may undermine international law's
reputation even further by setting an impossible standard for international law
to achieve. Since the rule of law is an important but not the only value that
legal systems possess, 86 it would be a mistake to exclude operational
noncompliance from our conceptualization of the international legal system,
and it would be a mistake as well to attempt to hide this reality.
Why, then, does this preoccupation with the international rule of law
persist and even flourish? Why does the belief that noncompliance is not a
part, nor should be a part, of the international legal system retain such force?
In part, the rejection of noncompliance reflects a romantic vision of the
international legal system. And, thus, the rejection of operational
noncompliance is, in part, an exercise in long-term wish-fulfillment by those
who hope to achieve an international system based on the rule of law that
currently does not exist.8 7 This romanticism is perhaps even more acute today
85. To put it another way, wouldn't acknowledging the role of noncompliance eliminate the
separation between decision rules and conduct rules in international law, undermining compliance? On
the concept of decision rules and conduct rules, see Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct
Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REv. 625 (1984).
86. See JOSEPH RAz, The Rule of Law and Its Virtue, in THE AUTHORITY OF LAW 210, 228
(1979) ("Since the rule of law is just one of the virtues the law should possess, it is to be expected that it
possesses no more than prima facie force. It has always to be balanced against competing claims of other
values.").
87. Cf BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 129 (2004)
("Steadfastly projecting the inevitability of a positive outcome [for the international rule of law] ... is
implicitly understood by [international lawyers] to be a necessary promotional step in its realization.");
Glennon, supra note 1, at 990 ("In the end, the moralists' strategy is wrong because it rests on a bad bet.
The bad bet is that the increase in long-range stability accomplished through delusion will outweigh the
discredit done to international law by pretending that its rules are different than they actually are.").
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than it was sixty years ago when the aspirations of international politicians
and lawyers were tempered by the realism that the world they were creating
was a work in progress.88
But there is more to it than that. International lawyers today are
concerned with the overwhelming-and it is thought undue-influence that
powerful States have on the development and enforcement of international
law. Operational noncompliance takes place when there is a disjunction in the
international system between institutional procedures and policy, and it is
power that most often bridges this operational gap. Those who resist the role
of operational noncompliance in the international legal system resist the role
and prerogatives of power and politics. 89 In particular, they resist the role of
the United States, the current global "hegemon," in shaping international law
to, presumably, meet its own ends. The rule of law, thus, is seen as the weak's
counterweight to the powerful, 90 and this is clearly the paramount reason why
the rule-of-law rhetoric in international law has become so pervasive and
extreme over the last decade.91
What this view misses is that law is the congruence of policy, authority,
and control, and, thus, without power there is no law. Instead of resisting the
role of power in making international law operable, international lawyers
should acknowledge and take account of the special responsibilities of the
powerful in shaping and enforcing international law and not just abiding by
it.92 This is not to suggest that international procedures can and should be
overridden at will by the United States or any other powerful State. It is to
suggest, instead, that today's international legal system needs to reconcile
itself to and make positive use of the disparate abilities of States, just as it has
done in the past.
93
B. Appraising Operational Noncompliance
Recognizing the role of operational noncompliance generally in the
international legal system is different, though, from appraising the legitimacy
of particular acts of noncompliance. The importance of understanding an
illegal act as legitimate is clear. Such a categorization recognizes the key
88. See HANS KELSEN, RECENT TRENDS IN THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A SUPPLEMENT
TO 'THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS' 912 (1951) ("[T]he principle ex injuriajus non oritur-law
cannot originate in an illegal act--has important exceptions. There are certainly cases where a new law
originates in the violation of an old law.... [In such cases,] we may say ex injuriajus oritur.").
89. Cf Martti Koskenniemi, The Politics ofInternational Law, 1 EUR. J. INT'L L. 4, 5 (1990)
("The fight for an international Rule of Law is a fight against politics ... ").
90. Cf E.P. THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK ACT 266 (1975).
91. There is an additional reason: international human rights advocates believe that the rule of
law, including the international rule of law, will promote the observance of human rights. See
Peerenboom, supra note 12.
92. On the notion of special or differential responsibilities, see W. Michael Reisman, Towards
a Normative Theory of Differential Responsibility for International Security Functions: Responsibilities
of Major Powers, in JAPAN AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE 43 (Nisuke Ando
ed., 1999); W. Michael Reisman, The United States and International Institutions, SURVIVAL, Winter
1999-2000, at 62; Christopher D. Stone, Common but Differentiated Responsibilities in International
Law, 98 Am. J. INT'L L. 276 (2004).
93. The most obvious example is the establishment of the U.N. Security Council with five
permanent members.
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status of the policies promoted by the act, provides incentives for States to
undertake similar acts in the future, and bolsters respect for international law
by demonstrating its operability. Yet, given the costs of noncompliance, not
all acts of operational noncompliance deserve the imprimatur of legitimacy.
It is important to distinguish characterizing an act as "legitimate" from
labeling it as "legal." The determination that an act is legal is a formal
exercise and, essentially, backward-looking because it compares what will or
has happened with established law. Legitimacy, on the other hand, is forward-
looking. It asks not what the rule is but what the rule should be in the
particular circumstances. Something that is legitimate may also become legal
in time, but that is not required, and, perhaps, more often than not, such a
development would be undesirable. Indeed, the State that engages in a
legitimate act of operational noncompliance may not wish the formal rule to
change.
Though it is beyond the scope of this Essay, criteria for legitimacy
should balance rule-of-law interests with operational interests, with a
presumption in favor of compliance, since that is the preferred outcome.94 An
appraisal might look at: (1) the noncompliant act's objectives (its policy
component); (2) the available alternatives (the necessity test); (3) the act's
precision (the narrowness test); and (4) the consequences of action and
inaction (the balancing of the harms). 5 To apply this appraisal would be
intensely fact-intensive and controversial, and ex ante one cannot give a
general account of how to weigh the factors. For present purposes, it is
sufficient to emphasize the possibility that certain acts of noncompliance
might be deemed legitimate.
Indeed, when acts of operational noncompliance have taken place, they
have often been described or treated in terms that connote legitimacy, either
explicitly or implicitly. For instance, many international lawyers described
and justified what happened in Kosovo in ethical terms, 96 or as the
Independent International Commission on Kosovo put it, as "illegal but
legitimate,''97 and the NATO countries were not criticized by the Security
Council or otherwise punished for their actions. When States verbally
94. See Raz, supra note 86, at 228.
95. Cf Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REv. 953 (1995) ("[T]he choice
between rules and rulelessness might well be based on a highly pragmatic, contextualized inquiry into
the costs of the two approaches in the area at hand.").
96. See, e.g., Allen Buchanan, From Nuremberg to Kosovo: The Morality of Illegal
International Legal Reform, Ill ETHics 673 (2001); Antonio Cassese, Ex Iniuria lus Oritur: Are We
Moving Towards International Legitimation of Forcible Humanitarian Countermeasures in the World
Community?, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 23 (1999). For critiques of this approach, see Koskenniemi, supra note
12, at 159, and John C. Yoo, The Dogs that Didn't Bark: Why Were International Law Scholars MIA on
Kosovo?, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 149 (2000).
97. INDEP. INT'L COMMISSION ON Kosovo, THE Kosovo REPORT 4 (2000); accord HOUSE OF
COMMONS, FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMMITrEE, FOuRTH REPORT, Kosovo, 1999-2000, H.C. 48-11, 138
("[W]e conclude that NATO's military action, if of dubious legality in the current state of international
law, was justified on moral grounds."). This phrase was repeated by those who were similarly conflicted
about the U.S. invasion of Iraq. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Good Reasons for Going Around the UN,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 18, 2003, at A33. Some others, fearful of an uncontrolled global hegemon in the
persona of the United States, categorically condemned the Kosovo intervention as a "serious threat to
the rule of law." Jules Lobel, Benign Hegemony? Kosovo and Article 2(4) of the UN. Charter, I CHI. J.
INT'L L. 19, 19 (2000).
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condemn but otherwise do not sanction an illegal act, such as the Israeli
bombing of the Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq in 1981,98 that is another way of
tacitly acknowledging an act as legitimate. Thus, even when the word
"legitimate" is not used, other words, concepts (exculpation, justification,
exception, mitigation), 99 and actions (or inactions) by authoritative actors
communicate the same (or similar) message.' 00
VI. CONCLUSION: COMING TO TERMS WITH NONCOMPLIANCE
The international legal system is only partially effective-it often lacks
the capacity of developed legal systems to create, alter, and enforce law and to
control international institutions, creating operational gaps. Given these gaps,
States, on occasion, violate the law and, by doing so, maintain the system's
operability. This is the technique of operational noncompliance. Because of
the key role operational noncompliance plays in maintaining the efficiency
and relevance of the international legal system, international lawyers should
be more willing to acknowledge the role of noncompliance than their
domestic counterparts but, in fact, they are not. Instead, international lawyers
steadfastly resist operational noncompliance, even when such noncompliance
might actually advance the relevance of international law by enforcing its
rules, by ensuring its rules are in accord with current or developing policies,
or by controlling international institutions. In the tradeoff between an effective
international system and an international system with a high level of formal
compliance, they prefer compliance. On this view, noncompliance, if it must
exist, cannot be countenanced by the legal system.
This choice of procedures over policy, as this Essay has sought to
demonstrate, is misconceived both as a descriptive and normative matter. The
international legal system makes use of noncompliant acts in all its processes,
as at times it must. This is not to suggest that all acts of operational
noncompliance are legitimate or that rules are not worthwhile. The costs of
operational noncompliance can be high and the benefits of maintaining
community procedures can be great. But such noncompliance "occupies a
distinguished and prominent place even in a legal system committed to rule-
bound justice and the rule of law." 101 Consequently, the legitimacy of
noncompliant acts must be assessed carefully on a case-by-case basis. In an
ideal world, this would not be the case, but we do not live in an ideal world,
and given the state of international institutions today, ignoring operational
98. See generally Anthony D'Amato, Israel's Air Strike Upon the Iraqi Nuclear Reactor, 77
AM. J. INT'L L. 584 (1983).
99. See, e.g., Mitchell N. Berman, Justification and Excuse, Law and Morality, 53 DUKE L.J.
1 (2003); Vaughan Lowe, Precluding Wrongfulness or Responsibility: A Plea for Excuses, 10 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 405 (1999). Compare, e.g., Kent Greenawalt, The Perplexing Borders of Justification and
Excuse, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1897 (1984), with Heidi M. Hurd, Justification and Excuse, Wrongdoing
and Culpability, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1551 (1999). Chapter V of Part I of the International Law
Commission's Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts proposes
certain "circumstances precluding wrongfulness." Draft Articles, supra note 67, at 48. These categories
and definitions are helpful, but too rigid.
100. For examples of the variety of possible characterizations of acts under international law,
see Carsten Stahn, Enforcement of the Collective Will After Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 804, 819 (2003).
101. Sunstein, supra note 95, at 1023 (referring to casuistry).
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noncompliance would limit the system's ability to achieve community
policies and risk making international law irrelevant. We must, therefore,
come to terms with noncompliance.
